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kompetencjach informacyjnych (miękkich), tj. edukacji do mediów.
Korzystanie z nowoczesnych technologii nie powinno być celem
samym w sobie, ale środkiem do poprawy jakości życia i aktywizacji
osób starszych.
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CHINA’S EXPERIENCE AS A GUIDELINE FOR
ATTRACTING FDI INTO UKRAINIAN ECONOMY
Abstract. This article aims at drawing similarities between the economies
of the People’s Republic of China and Ukraine and using Chinese
experience as a guideline for developing national investment potential.
Nowadays, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the
most attractive destinations for foreign direct investments, as all
countries are actively involved in investment relations with it. As of
2015, the volume of the injected FDI is 135,61 billion dollars with a
forecast of the further increase in 2016 [9]. Even though China faces a
significant challenge of foreign capital outflow, it is still powerful and
its economy attracts multi-billion investment projects. For this reason,
it is critical to take a closer look at the investment-related experience
of the country and speculate on the ways to turn it into a guideline for
benefitting the economy of Ukraine by crafting ideas to launch
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initiatives for inviting FDI into the domestic economy. That said, the
objective of this paper is to draw the lines between the economies of
China and Ukraine and identify the intersections, which might be
helpful for boosting Ukraine’s economic development by introducing
a China-like model of raising funds.
To begin with there are numerous factors contributing to the
attractiveness of the Chinese economy such as cheap but high-skilled
labor, vast industrial potential, favorable policy of the Central Bank,
macroeconomic and financial stability with the exception of recent
capital outflow, advantageous legislation as well as flexible taxation
regimes and the existence of special economic zones [7, p. 10—11].
At the same time, business environment in the PRC is characterized
by excessive bureaucratic hurdles, common conflicts of interests, high
level of corruption, violations of confidentiality, and unclear
legislative frameworks, which are too intricate regardless of the
opportunities they guarantee to foreign investors [5]. Taking a closer
look at common investment bottlenecks of the Chinese economy, it is
evident that there are some similarities with the Ukrainian investment
environment, as it is featured by extreme severity of corruption,
especially at the highest level and excessive bureaucratic procedures
as well as ambiguous and contradictory legislation aimed at regulating
investment and property relations [3, p. 9]. Therefore it is imperative
to answer the following question: if the challenges are identical, can
the Chinese model be applied to addressing them and developing
Ukraine’s investment potential?
To properly address this question, it is paramount to be aware of
the specificities of investment regulations in both the People’s
Republic of China and Ukraine in order to identify the gaps that could
and should be filled. To begin with, the primary peculiarity of the
Chinese investment environment is the existence of a division of
industries into several blocks — those prohibiting, restricting,
permitting, and encouraging the injection of foreign investments. For
example, environmental protection and high-tech projects are
encouraged, media, financial services, and mining are restricted, while
culture, sports, education, entertainment, and some scientific projects
are prohibited [2, p. 24-25]. In fact, China is overprotective when it
comes to estimating the business surrounding of the country.
However, it can be easily explained by the current transition from the
quantitative growth of FDI volume to qualitative, i.e. attracting funds
into the sectors lacking adequate financing.
Another specificity of the PRC’s environment is the so-called tax
holiday — the reduction or exemption of corporate income tax for
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foreign investors for the period of five to ten years or even the overall
duration of operation based on the sector of operation and the nature
of an investment project. For instance, software and IT enterprises are
granted five years of tax holidays, infrastructure and environmentally
friendly technologies projects are entitled to six years of the tax break,
and IC production projects are characterized by ten years of tax
exemption. This preference is granted starting from the first profit-
making year. Moreover, it is essential to note that forestry, animal-
husbandry, fishery, and agriculture projects are entitled to either tax
exemption or 50 % reduction for the general duration of the project
[8, p. 5].
As for Ukraine, the situation is different. First of all, there is no
strict division into permitted and restricted industries for injecting
foreign capital. Nevertheless, publishing activities, owning
agricultural lands and manufacturing carrier rockets are prohibited
[3, p. 9]. In addition, some projects such as insurance companies and
television are subjects of strict governmental regulation [1, p. 3].
Moreover, there are numerous tax incentives granting tax reduction or
exemption, e.g. special VAT regime for the most qualified agriculture
manufacturers, IT production, mining, and electricity produced from
renewable energy resources [1, p. 3]. Finally, unlike China, the
process of setting up a foreign enterprise is simplified, as there is no
strict or lengthy permit process. More than that, Ukraine’s investment
environment operates under the so-called silent consent rule.
According to it, if the authorities do not respond to a properly
submitted application within a specified period (usually 30 days), and
applicant is allowed to start a business without a permit, even though
it is recommended to obtain one [3, p. 9; 6, p. 120].
Based on the facts mentioned above, the key differences in
regulating investment activities in China and Ukraine are
insignificant. Instead, what matters is the stage of economic
development and the country’s economic potential. As it was stated
above, PRC attracted almost 140 billion dollars in 2015. Ukraine, on
the other hand, managed to receive 4 billion dollars. It is a spectacular
increase compares to 411 million dollars obtained in 2014 [10, p. 60].
However, there is still a lot of work to do. Nowadays, the demand for
foreign investment exceeds 20 billion dollars necessary for conducting
in-depth structural reforms and reloading domestic economy. It means
that the country is in need for quantitative growth of the attracted FDI
volume. This strategic objective can be achieved by following China’s
path of developing investment potential and boosting growth. First of
all, the state should become actively involved in the process of
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attracting foreign capital. Significant attention should be paid to
overcoming the challenge of corruption. Even though PRC is as well
known for corruption at the highest level, its magnitude is not as
impressive as in Ukraine.
 Still, the solution to the current lack of foreign financing can be
found in historical retrospective and the initial stages of China’s
investment development. The primary emphasis should be put on
cautious encouragement, which was a common practice in PRC
during 1984-1991, and active encouragement popular during 1992—
1996. The idea is to be aware of the potentially promising or
threatening projects. Because in most cases, foreign entities are set up
under the ‘silent consent’ rule, it means that the state is ignorant and
does not investigate their potential activities. Based on the drawn
recommendation, the state should encourage IT and renewable energy
projects. Even though they are stated among those entitled to tax
exemption, in order to benefit the national economy, it is advisable to
control their operations and determine the necessary timeframes for
similar exemptions, i.e. once they are making enough profit, VTA can
be reduced instead of being totally exempted.
As for now, the functions of reviewing investment projects and
designing investment policy are carried out by the Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine. However, it is
essential to note that up to 2015, this role was granted to the State
Agency for Investments and National Projects of Ukraine, but it was
put into liquidation. Nowadays, there is no significant need for
creating a new agency. Instead, it is crucial to concentrate on
developing a comprehensive investment policy, which would address
the needs and potential of regions. In addition, the creation and
support of localized centers responsible for reviewing investment
projects, as it was adopted in China during the phase of active
encouragement, is as well advisable in order to guarantee strict control
over foreign investors as well as protect their rights [4, p. 15]. More
than that, local centers could be divided into departments based on the
industries and sectors of operation. Furthermore, during the specified
period, the Chinese government gave preference to powerful investors
with large shares of overseas markets. Because Ukraine possesses vast
labor resources, they might be involved in manufacturing. In case if a
potential investor is a powerful entity with a growing demand for its
products, this step is recommended, as the supply, i.e. manufacturing,
would constantly boost solving the problem of unemployment.
Finally, it is vital to invest in IT startups. As for now, Ukraine is a
homeland to numerous outstanding ideas that are presented at
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International Consumer Electronic Shows every year. Because, for the
most part, they face the challenge of inadequate funding, they are
launched abroad, especially in the Silicon Valley in the United States,
and benefit foreign economies.
To sum up, nowadays, Ukraine experiences significant economic
hardships connected to political and social instability. Nevertheless,
there are some potential ways to handle this problem by following the
path of the People’s Republic of China, especially ones it took during
the early stages of development. That said, in order to boost
investment activities, it is advisable to review investment policy with
the aim of designing a comprehensive approach to regulating this
sphere of economic relations. The emphasis should be put on cautious
but active encouragement of foreign projects, i.e. making maximum
effort to individualize an applicable tax framework in order to satisfy
the needs and opportunities of both investors and regions.
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SOME COMPONENTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY OF UKRAINE
Abstract. The approaches to the doctrine of long-term development of
Ukraine, considering realities of functioning national economy, are
substantiated. It is proposed diversification of Ukraine’s economy to
realize by two directions: through the modernization of traditional sectors
and infrastructure and active transition to knowledge-intensive non-raw
sectors of production and services.
At present, the transformation of existing global system of
economic and political relations is underway. For Ukraine’s economy
this generates new challenges though, at the same time, reveals new
opportunities–to identify new strategic economic priorities and
drastically change the model of economic development of the country.
Ukraine yet again finds itself at the interception of development
trajectories and by constantly postponing the implementation of the
strategic objectives of the state would feel extremely dire
consequences of non-systemic reforms, technological underdeve-
lopment of the domestic economy, populism and legal nihilism.
Ukraine must become a highly organized country that would create
conditions for sustainable development and offer a wide range of
opportunities for individual development. This will increase the sense
of justice and social solidarity, and public confidence.
Researches, that are associated with determination of ways to
achieve the long-term growth on qualitative basis taking into account
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